Tuesday, 27 October 2009

Identifying the origin of an unauthorised live pay-per-view TV stream

TV streaming sites are becoming popular. Some people relay the content onto the Internet to the public (sometimes for a charge). PPV organisers have a difficult time dealing with these sites but the problem could be cut off at source.

This method offers no solution to a stream relayed privately. The PPV broadcaster must be posing as an unauthorised viewer.

No solution should cause interference to those that have genuinely paid.

How could this be done?

If each individual transmission of content can be controlled then a unique identifier could be sent to each.

If it's put in the middle of the screen then it would be annoying. It is was permanently placed on the edge of the screen it could be cropped out and any other variation could be obscured with a time delay function.

Another way would be with a subtle change to the entire image such as a brightness, colour, or contrast change, or content such as the timing of switching between cameras.

With 1 million possibilities you might think it would be difficult to trace a source with such a rudimentary method but if each individual PPV stream can be controlled then it's easy using a binary search method.

While observing the unauthorised stream the change is made to each half of the 1 million viewers to identify which 500,000 the source is in. Then it is repeated for the 500,000, 250,00, 125,000... And so on.

With 1 million pay-per-view buys it only takes 20 iterations to identify the origin to cut them off at a moment to cause maximum disruption.

If the origin of video isn't from a PPV source but a broadcasted stream sent to another national market (as happens with many sporting events) then I have no sympathy for any company involved in price discrimination.

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